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PREVIEW—Montana and Wyoming v. Washington: The Commerce 
Clause and the Clean Water Act Collide Over Coal Exports 
 
Rachel L. Wagner* 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not scheduled oral 
arguments for this matter. In October 2020, the Court asked for the federal 
government’s views on the case but has not yet decided whether it will 
exercise its jurisdiction over the challenge.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Montana and Wyoming seek original jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court of the United States because the State of Washington denied a Clean 
Water Act Section 401 permit for a private company’s proposed coal 
export terminal in Washington. Montana and Wyoming v. Washington 
asks whether Washington’s denial of port access to ship Montana and 
Wyoming coal to foreign markets violates the Commerce Clause. Montana 
and Wyoming assert that Washington’s discriminatory denial of the 
Section 401 certification violates the Dormant Commerce and Foreign 
Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. Washington, in 
response, argues that the permit denial was not discriminatory and was 
denied because the proposed coal terminal project did not comply with 
state law. This case is significant because litigation over a coal export 
terminal is unfolding against a backdrop of extensive changes to the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of Section 401 and 
could have broad impacts to Section 401 certification determinations 
under state law.   
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Congress established the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nations waters.”1 Under Section 401 of the CWA, any applicant for a 
federal license or permit to conduct any activity that may result in any 
discharge into navigable waters must provide the federal licensing or 
permitting agency with a Section 401 certification.2 A discharge is defined 
as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”3 The 
certification, issued by the state where the discharge originates, attests that 
the discharge will comply with applicable provisions of certain 
enumerated sections of the CWA. Section 401 provides states, certain 
 
* Rachel L. Wagner, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of 
Law at the University of Montana.   
 
1.  Clean Water Act § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2019). 
2.  Id. § 1341. The statute defines “navigable waters” at CWA § 502(7); 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
3.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
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tribes, and in certain circumstances, the EPA, the authority to: (1) grant, 
(2) grant with conditions, (3) deny, or (4) waive certification of proposed 
federal licenses or permits that may result in a discharge into waters of the 
United States.4 
This case arose after the State of Washington denied the necessary 
CWA permit (“Section 401 Certification”) for a sublease of state-owned 
aquatic lands to Lighthouse Resources, Inc., Lighthouse Products, LLC, 
LHR Infrastructure, LLC, LHR Coal LLC, and Millennium Bulk 
Terminals-Longview, LLC (collectively, “Lighthouse”) for a proposed 
coal export terminal along the Columbia River in Cowlitz County, 
Washington. Lighthouse proposed the so-called Millennium Bulk 
Terminal (“Terminal”) to access foreign export markets for Wyoming and 
Montana coal.5 The proposal would convert a former aluminum smelter 
site into a terminal with the capacity to export 44 million metric tons of 
coal per year.6 The Terminal would receive coal from the Powder River 
Basin in Montana, Wyoming, and the Uinta Basin in Utah and Colorado 
via rail shipment.7 The Terminal would receive, store, and load coal onto 
ships, and the coal would then travel via the Columbia River and Pacific 
Ocean to markets in Asia.8 Given the size of the project, Lighthouse 
needed to obtain several federal, state, and local approvals.9  
In 2012, Lighthouse applied for a Section 401 water quality 
certification because the project may result in discharge into waters of the 
United States, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. The CWA seeks to “recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate [water] pollution.”10 The permit application 
triggered an environmental review under the Washington State 
Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”).11 Initially, the Washington 
Department of Ecology (“Ecology”), Cowlitz County, and the United 
States Army Corp of Engineers (“Corp”) sought to undertake a joint 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). Under Washington law, 
agencies are required to assess the end use of products exported from 
Washington ports.12 However, after Ecology demanded the EIS include an 
analysis of the impact of global greenhouse gas emissions from coal in 
foreign markets, the Corp decided not to participate in a joint EIS.  
 
4.  Clean Water Act § 401(a)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  
5.  Northwest Alloys, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 447 P.3d 
620, 624 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).  
6.  Id. 
7.  Millennium Bulk Terminals–Longview, Final SEPA Environmental 
Impact Statement Summary, § S.1, p. S-1, https://perma.cc/27DR-67UX [hereinafter 
“EIS Summary”]. 
8.  EIS Summary, § S.1, p. S-1, https://perma.cc/27DR-67UX. 
9.  Def. Br. In Opp. at 4, June 22, 2020, No. 220152.  
10.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2020).  
11. Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 9, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Rev. Code 
Wash. 43.21C et seq.). 
12.   Wash. Admin. Code 197–11–060(4)(b). 
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The EIS, jointly published by Ecology and Cowlitz County in 
2017, identified nine potential environmental impacts that could result 
from construction and operation of the Terminal.13 The EIS concluded 
“[t]here would be no unavoidable and significant adverse environmental 
impacts on water quality.”14 Except for the unmitigable potential impact 
on air quality, the EIS determined that mitigation efforts could resolve 
potential environmental impacts.15 Cowlitz County issued a report 
recommending approval of Lighthouse’s permit application, with several 
mitigation conditions.16  
Following the EIS, Ecology continued with its review of 
Lighthouse’s Section 401 Certification application to determine whether 
its proposal conformed with Washington’s water quality requirements.17 
Generally, if water quality issues remain unresolved by the Section 401 
certification deadline, Ecology’s practice is to deny the certification 
“without prejudice.”18 A letter drafted but never sent by Ecology staff 
stated that denying the application “without prejudice would not in any 
way preclude [Lighthouse] from resubmitting a request for a [water quality 
certification] at a later date.”19 However, despite the drafted letter, Ecology 
subsequently denied Lighthouse’s application “with prejudice.”20 The 
“with prejudice” denial precluded Lighthouse from resubmitting its 
application. Washington denied Lighthouse’s application for a Section 
401 permit on the following two grounds: (1) the Terminal’s “significant 
unavoidable adverse impacts” identified in the EIS conflicted with SEPA 
policies; and (2) Washington did not have reasonable assurance that the 
Terminal would meet water quality standards.21 The denial was based on 
Ecology’s discretionary authority under SEPA.22 Lighthouse appealed the 
Ecology’s denial, but the Pollution Control Hearings Board affirmed the 
permit denial, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.23  
 On January 21, 2020, Montana and Wyoming filed a motion 
requesting that the United States Supreme Court review Ecology’s denial 
of the CWA certification. In July 2020, several months after the parties 
submitted briefs in this matter, the EPA issued a final water quality 
 
13.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 9. 
14.  Id. at 11. 
15.  Id.  
16.  Id.  
17.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. At 11; Order on Defendants’ and Intervenor Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment at *2, Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-
05005-RJB, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018). 
18.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 11.  
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 12; Def’s Br. In Resp. at 8 (citing Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, 
No. 3:18-c-05005-RJB, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018). 
21.  Pls’ Br. in Supp. at 12.  
22.  Id.  
23.  Def’s Br. In Resp. (citing Order on Defendants’ and the Intervenor-
Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at *2, Lighthouse Res. Inc., 2018 
WL 6505372). 
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certification rule (“2020 Final Rule”) that went into effect on September 
11, 2020, and replaced the prior implementing regulations from 1971.24 
The 2020 Final Rule includes numerous changes to existing regulation and 
practice that narrow the authority of states when acting on Section 401 
certification requests. The 2020 Final Rule limits the application of 
Section 401 to point source discharges into waters of the United States.25 
The changes in the 2020 Final Rule also narrow the scope of review and 
conditions to focus on water quality requirements, specifically excluding 
consideration of other non-water-quality impacts.26 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The parties disagree on whether the Court has original jurisdiction 
to hear the controversy, and more importantly, whether Washington’s 
denial of a Section 401 permit for the Terminal violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. This case will likely turn on the Court’s analysis of the 
parties’ Dormant Commerce Clause arguments. 
A.  Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
Plaintiffs argue the Court should exercise its original jurisdiction 
because Washington’s alleged discrimination against Montana and 
Wyoming coal is costing the states millions in taxes and revenue––a direct 
injury impacting Montana’s and Wyoming’s sovereign interests. Plaintiffs 
contend that Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification resulted 
in a discriminatory closure of Washington’s ports to coal from Montana 
and Wyoming, in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Foreign Commerce Clause.27 Plaintiffs allege that by denying Section 401 
certification, Washington blocked the construction of the port based on its 
desire to protect exports of Washington agricultural products over out-of-
state coal and an unjustified concern about the extraterritorial effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions from shipping coal to overseas markets.28 
Plaintiffs argue that Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification 
 
24.  Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42210, 
July 13, 2020 [hereinafter “2020 Final Rule”].  
25.  Id. at 42234. 
26.  Id. at 42256. In the preamble to the 2020 Final Rule, EPA stated the 
agency is “aware of circumstances in which some States have denied certifications on 
grounds that are unrelated to water quality requirements and that are beyond the scope 
of CWA section 401.” However, since the 2020 Final Rule, President Joe Biden issued 
an Executive Order titled “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and 
Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis,” which directed certain agency actions 
to be reviewed, including the July 13, 2020 CWA 401 Certification Rule. Even if the 
new rule remains in effect, litigation surrounding implementation of Section 401 will 
likely continue.  
27.  Bill of Complaint, Montana & Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152, 
¶ 1 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).  
28.  Id. ¶¶ 39, 44, 49. 
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for those reasons imposes a burden on interstate commerce and constitutes 
an impermissible attempt to regulate conduct outside its borders in 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.29 Plaintiffs also allege the 
Section 401 denial impedes their ability to engage in foreign commerce 
and infringes on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate 
foreign commerce, in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause.30  
 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction 
Plaintiffs argue that the “seriousness and dignity” of their claims, 
and the lack of an alternative forum to litigate the issues and provide 
appropriate relief, warrants the Court’s original jurisdiction.31 Plaintiffs 
assert Washington’s complete bar on their access to an international 
shipping port and resulting loss of severance tax and coal production 
revenue implicate important sovereign interests.32 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ 
claim that Washington’s discriminatory denial of the Section 401 
Certification for the coal terminal violates the Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is 
sufficient to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction.33  
 
2.  Washington’s Dormant Commerce Clause Violations 
Plaintiffs argue Washington’s treatment of the Section 401 
Certification is unconstitutional because its effect favors Washington’s 
economic interests over Montana’s and Wyoming’s.34 Plaintiffs further 
contend Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial was motivated by 
political reasons, and the Dormant Commerce Clause prevents a state from 
interfering with interstate commerce based on political and extra-territorial 
concerns.35 
Plaintiffs assert that Washington denied the Section 401 
Certification for pretextual reasons and that Washington’s true motive was 
to benefit its own economic interests in violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.36 Plaintiffs rely on cases in which the Court 
emphasized the principle that states are not permitted to “promote [their] 
own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate 
commerce.”37 Plaintiffs present evidence that Washington “publicly 
stated” it denied the Section 401 Certification, in part, to protect its 
 
29.  Id. ¶¶ 48–57.  
30.  Bill of Complaint, Montana & Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152, 
¶¶ 59–65 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).  
31.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 18, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152. 
32.  Id. at 19. 
33.  Id. at 21. 
34.  Id. at 25.  
35.  Id. at 28.  
36.  Id. at 24. 
37.  Id. at 25 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 
(1949)).   
6 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
economic interests.38 Specifically, Plaintiffs explain, Washington 
explicitly denied the permit because “[i]ncreased coal trains from the 
[Terminal] proposal would compete with rail shipments of other goods, 
including Washington’s important agricultural products.”39 Therefore, 
Plaintiffs argue, Washington’s overt economic protectionism is per se 
invalid because it is in contrast to the Commerce Clause and the Court’s 
precedent interpreting it.40 
Plaintiffs further argue the Dormant Commerce Clause is as 
concerned with the “practical effects” of state action as it is with economic 
protectionism.41 Plaintiffs assert local governments in California and 
Oregon have joined forces with Washington to block West Coast port 
access to export coal.42 This politically motivated hostility, and 
“gate[keeping] of the national economy,” Plaintiffs contend, is prohibited 
by the Dormant Commerce Clause because it constricts the flow of 
commerce.43 Plaintiffs specifically claim that Washington Governor Jay 
Inslee and his political campaign to “control global greenhouse gas 
emissions” was the driving force to ensure his appointees denied the 
permit––with prejudice––for the coal export terminal.44 Plaintiffs assert 
that Washington law––which explicitly requires that agencies consider a 
product’s end use, and the impact that use has beyond the State’s borders–
–is an unconstitutional extension of its police power beyond its 
jurisdictional bounds.45 Consequently, according to Plaintiffs, 
Washington’s politically motivated permit denial had the practical effect 
of restricting the free-flow of commerce, and therefore triggered a 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.46  
 
 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. Plaintiffs also cite other statements by Washington, such as the 
“Millennium proposal would only ship coal, there would be no [Washington] apples,” 
and “Aerospace brings thousands of jobs with those emissions; coal export doesn’t.” 
40.  Id. at 25–26 (see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978)).  
41.  Id. at 26 (citing Brown Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor 
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986)).  
42.  Id. at 27 (citing Bill Lucia, With West Coast States Blocking Coal 
Export Projects, Proponents Keep Pushing, ROUTE FIFTY (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/MJ66-5BEA). 
43.  Id.   
               44.   Id. at 28 (citing E-mails RE: Gov’s call with Boeing on July 25 and 
ghg emission triggers (Mar. 2, 2013–July 24, 2013)). 
45.  Pls’ Br. in Resp., at 10, June 22, 2020, No. 220152; Pls’ Br. in Supp. 
at 29.  
46.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 31. To supports their claim, Plaintiffs cite to 
Governor Inslee’s oral statement that Washington-based Boeing would not face 
similar scrutiny as the coal export terminal because it’s a “very different commodity 
than coal” and that he would expect a “much different SEPA approach [to] apply to a 
proposed [Boeing] project.”  
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3.  Washington’s Alleged Foreign Commerce Clause Violation 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue Washington’s denial of the Section 401 
Certification to prevent the construction of a coal port violates the Foreign 
Commerce Clause because it “implicates foreign policy issues which must 
be left to the Federal government [and] violates a clear federal directive.”47 
Plaintiffs rely on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,48 to further its 
position that foreign commerce is “a matter of national concern” that 
“requires the Nation to speak with ‘one voice.’”49 This need for federal 
uniformity, Plaintiffs argue, makes state restrictions on foreign commerce 
subject to “rigorous and searching scrutiny.”50  
Plaintiffs contend the United States has an unambiguous foreign 
policy to support coal export.51 Plaintiffs cite to remarks by former 
President Trump at the “Unleashing American Energy Event” and a 2017 
Executive Order to support their claim that the United States has expressed 
a clear position on the benefits of exporting coal to foreign markets to the 
American economy and national security.52 Moreover, Plaintiffs rely on a 
report issued by the U.S. Secretary of Energy that recommended 
developing West Coast terminal capacity.53 The report noted the “limited 
capacity of export terminals has greatly limited the ability to export” 
coal.54 
Plaintiffs also argue a strong export market for coal is not limited 
to the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. Plaintiffs’ assert that 
President Obama thought coal export was important––especially coal 
export to Asia.55 Thus, Plaintiffs contend, the United States has a history 
of expressing an unambiguous foreign policy to support coal exports. 
Consequently, Washington’s decision to block Plaintiffs from developing 
a coal export terminal prevents them from accessing foreign markets and 
prevents the “United States from speaking with ‘one voice,’ and 
contravenes clear federal directive.”56 
 
47.  Id. at 32 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).  
48.      441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
49.  Id. at 31 (internal citations omitted). 
50.  Id. at 32 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 
U.S. 82, 100 (1984)); see also Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 
505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992).  
51.  Id.  
               52.  Id. (citing Remarks by President Trump at the Unleashing American 
Energy Event (June 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS43-Z9PK; Executive Order 13783 
(March 28, 2017)). 
 53. Id. at 33 (citing Letter from Rick Perry to Greg Workman, (January 
7, 2018), https://perma.cc/P993-YA6U). 
54.  Id. at 33 (citing Advancing U.S. Coal Exports, National Coal Council, 
2–10 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/MR7C-RJE7). 
55.  Id. at 34 (quoting David Frenthold and Michael Shear, As Obama 
Visits Coal Country, Many Are Wary of His Environmental Policies, WASHINGTON 
POST (Apr. 25, 2010)).  
56.  Id.  
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B.  Defendant’s Arguments 
Washington argues that Congress expressly authorized states to 
deny certification under CWA Section 401, and so Plaintiffs may not 
challenge the denial under the Dormant Commerce Clause.57 Washington 
further argues that the Section 401 denial does not amount to an embargo 
against coal from Plaintiffs because millions of tons of coal already move 
through Washington, including at the site of the proposed terminal.58 
Washington also disputes Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Section 401 
Certification denial was protectionist and discriminatory by stating the 
denial was neutral and not motivated economic protectionism.59 Finally, 
Washington contends that the Section 401 Certification denial does not 
violate the Foreign Commerce Clause for the same reasons it does not 
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and also because it does not affect 
the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice when regulating 
foreign commerce.60 
 
1.  The Court’s Original Jurisdiction and Standing 
First, Washington argues the Court should not exercise its original 
jurisdiction because the nature of Plaintiffs’ interest, the “seriousness and 
dignity of the claim,” and the availability of an alternative forum in which 
the issue can be resolved weigh against the Supreme Court exercising its 
original jurisdiction.61 
Next, Washington asserts Plaintiffs do not have standing because 
the harm they allege is speculative.62 Because Plaintiffs are not the “object 
of the government action or inaction” they challenge, Washington asserts 
standing is more difficult to establish.63 Washington argues Plaintiffs will 
not lose tax revenue because coal mined in Montana and Wyoming will 
not be barred from reaching Asian markets.64 Rather, Washington alleges 
Plaintiffs inappropriately rely on projected tax revenues from the export 
of coal to Asian markets65 because a high volume of coal exports from the 
 
57.  Def’s Br. in Opp’n for Mot. for Leave to File Compl., Montana & 
Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152, at 20–21 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020) (quoting Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986), and Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. Of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985)). 
58.  Def’s Br. In Opp’n at 23–27. 
59.  Id. at 27–33. 
60.  Id. at 34. Washington also argues that the case is not appropriate for 
Supreme Court review because the denial of a Section 401 certification “does not 
directly implicate any other States’ sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests” but instead 
is “at its core . . . a challenge to the denial of a private company’s permit application 
to build a privately owned project.” 
61.  Id. at 16.  
62.  Id. at 17. 
63.  Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 
(1992)). 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 18. 
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United States to Asia is not projected after 2017 as the global economy 
shifts to renewable energy.66 
 
2.  Dormant Commerce Clause Claim 
Washington argues Plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claims suffer 
from three fatal flaws: (1) Congress expressly authorizes states to deny 
Clean Water Act permits that violate state law; (2) Plaintiffs improperly 
rely on the premise that Washington has “placed an embargo on coal” from 
Montana and Wyoming; and (3) Plaintiffs’ argument that Washington’s 
decision to deny a permit was motivated by economic protectionism 
“makes no sense” and does not align with the record.67  
Washington claims Ecology denied the Section 401 Certification 
because Lighthouse did not comply with state water quality standards.68 
The agency’s denial, Washington argues, is merely an exercise of 
Congress’ delegated authority to the states—authority to deny certification 
under Section 401 where state water quality standards are not met.69 To 
support its claim, Washington relies on the Order Denying Section 401 
Water Certification to cite several water quality violations including: 
Lighthouse’s failure to submit a wetlands mitigation plan; failure to submit 
adequate “wastewater characterization and treatment data;” failure to 
show it complied with the required methods of treating wastewater; failure 
to comply with Washington’s antidegradation requirements; and failure to 
provide enough information about “potential toxic discharges to the 
Columbia River.”70 Because this denial implements the CWA, 
Washington asserts, this implementation of federal law does not violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.71 
Washington relies on state law to argue that approving the 
Terminal conflicts with SEPA.72 Citing CWA Section 401, Washington 
contends Ecology did not have reasonable assurance the project would 
meet “both applicable water quality standards and any other appropriate 
requirements of state law.”73 Citing the EIS, Washington articulated nine 
environmental resource areas that would suffer significant adverse 
environmental impacts if Lighthouse moved forward with the Terminal.74 
The EIS identified impacts on two resource areas that implicate water 
 
               66.  Id. (citing Ian Goodman, Expert Report on Millennium Bulk 
Terminals-Longview/Lighthouse (Goodman, Expert Report) at 37 (Table 5), 198 
(Nov. 14, 2018). 
67.  Id. at 20. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 22. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. at 23. 
73.  Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); PUD 1 of Jefferson County v. 
Washington State Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711–13 (1994)).  
74.  Def. Br. In Opp. at 22, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Order 
Denying Section 401 Water Quality Certification at 10–11, 12–13). 
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quality, namely, increased traffic on the Columbia River, and impacts on 
“aquatic habitat, fish survival, and tribal fishing and treaty rights.”75 
Consequently, Washington argues, it should not have to set aside water 
quality laws—that Congress explicitly authorized—just so Lighthouse can 
build a coal export terminal.76 
Second, Washington argues its Section 401 Certification denial is 
not an embargo on Montana and Wyoming coal because, each year, coal 
from these states “pass[es] through Washington for export.”77 Washington 
notes that there is capacity for exporting coal at existing ports because “of 
the lack of demand for coal, not because of any imagined ‘embargo.’”78 
Citing Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Obersly, which held that a Delaware law 
did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because it did not prohibit 
the export of coal and was not discriminatory, Washington argues that 
even if Plaintiffs are unable to export as much coal as they would like 
because of the permit denial, it does not violate the Commerce Clause 
because it does not prevent the movement of coal through the State or the 
export of coal to Asia.79   
Washington argues that Plaintiffs have no evidence Washington 
discriminatorily denied the Section 401 permit to benefit in-state 
industries in the same market––here, Washington agricultural products.80 
Even if Plaintiffs had actual evidence of Washington’s economic 
protectionism, Washington asserts they have not provided any case law or 
authority to support their claim.81 Again relying on Norfolk, Washington 
wields the Court’s reasoning to further its argument that differential 
treatment of industries does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.82 
Rather, as articulated in Norfolk, “[t]he Supreme Court has never adopted 
such a broad gauged view of a discriminatory effect; it has found . . . 
discriminatory effects only where the state law advantages in-state 
business in relation to out-of-state business in the same market.”83 
Moreover, Washington argues that the permit application was not 
denied—as clearly articulated in Ecology’s Order—because it favored in-
state industry or disfavored out-of-state industry.84 Washington argues the 
decision to deny the permit was “on its face neutral,” and cites Minnesota 
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,85 to assert the Court should defer to the 
stated reasons for the denial unless those reasons “could not have been a 
goal” of the finding.86 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 23. 
77.  Id. at 24. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. (citing 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
80.  Id. at 27–28. 
81.  Id. at 28. 
82.  Id.  
83.  Id. (quoting Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 402) (emphasis added). 
84.  Id. at 29. 
85.  Id. (citing 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 n.15 (1981)). 
86.  Id. 
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Finally, Washington argues Plaintiffs’ assertion—that Governor 
Inslee “commandeered” the approval process—is baseless.87 First, relying 
on testimony by the Director of Ecology, Washington points out the 
Director testified that “she did not rely on greenhouse gas emissions in 
making [her decision] nor did she harbor any ‘anti-coal’ bias.”88 Similarly, 
the EIS did not cite greenhouse gas emissions among the project’s 
significant adverse impacts.89 Thus, Washington argues, because each 
state has “substantial latitude to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of 
its residents, and to protect its environment and natural resources,” 
Plaintiffs’ characterization of a Section 401 denial as a “political and moral 
judgment” on other states is flawed. Moreover, Washington argues, the 
only type of discrimination that matters under the Commerce Clause is 
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burden[s] the latter.”90 Here, Washington 
concludes, there is no evidence of such differential treatment.91 
 
3.  Foreign Commerce Clause Claim  
Washington argues its Section 401 permit denial does not violate 
the Foreign Commerce Clause for the same reasons it does not violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. However, Washington expands on its 
Dormant Commerce Clause argument, asserting its denial of the Section 
401 Certification for the Terminal does not affect the federal government’s 
ability to “speak with one voice” regarding foreign commerce.92  
Washington argues it is not the “unambiguous foreign policy of 
the United States to support coal export.”93 Washington criticizes 
Plaintiffs’ reliance on a “speech by the President, an Executive Order that 
never mentions exports, and an advisory committee report prepared by 
coal industry representatives,” stating this is “hardly evidence” of an 
“unambiguous foreign policy” supporting coal exports.94  
Even if there were a clear federal policy, Washington asserts, its 
denial would not contradict the policy because the State determined “this 
particular project at this particular location” cannot be approved under 
state and federal water quality laws.95 The permit denial does not block the 
export of coal through other terminals, nor does it block Plaintiffs’ access 
to foreign markets.96  
 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 30.  
89.  Id. (citing Millennium, 2020 WL 1651475, at *2). 
90.  Id. at 33 (citing Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
91.  Id. at 30. 
92.  Id. at 34 (citing Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 
449 (1979)).  
93.  Id. at 35. 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id. at 36.  
96.  Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether Washington 
regulators violated the Dormant Commerce and Foreign Commerce 
clauses when it denied a Section 401 permit for the Terminal project in 
Longview, Washington. A ruling in favor of Montana and Wyoming could 
support EPA’s contention that the scope of Section 401 certification is 
narrow, and thus would strengthen EPA’s position in the cases challenging 
the 2020 Final Rule. Furthermore, while Washington denied Lighthouse’s 
water quality certification application and Montana and Wyoming filed 
their complaint before EPA issued the 2020 Final Rule, EPA’s recent 
criticism of broader-based certification denials may encourage the Court 
to scrutinize more closely the basis for Washington’s denial of the Section 
401 Certification. On the other hand, a ruling in favor of Washington may, 
if it addresses the appropriate scope of certification review, lead district 
courts to view the 2020 Final Rule with greater skepticism. 
 
A.  The Court’s Original Jurisdiction and Standing 
The Court will likely find that Plaintiffs have standing to sue 
because Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification directly 
affects Plaintiffs’ ability to collect severance tax revenues from its coal 
extraction and its injury is substantial enough to establish standing. 
Moreover, this case is appropriate for the Court’s original jurisdiction 
because Plaintiffs’ claims involve the transportation of natural resources 
and there is not an alternative forum to hear the dispute. In deciding 
whether to grant leave to file a complaint in a dispute arising under the 
Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court examines two factors: (1) “the 
interest of the complaining State, focusing on the seriousness and dignity 
of the claim;” and (2) “the availability of an alternative forum in which the 
issue tendered may be resolved.”97 The Court has previously entertained 
several cases among states involving Commerce Clause claims, 
specifically in cases involving the transportation or taxation of natural 
resources.98 Here, because the case involves Commerce Clause claims 
involving the transportation of natural resources, the first prong is easily 
met.  
Additionally, there is no other forum in which Plaintiffs’ interests 
will find an appropriate hearing and full relief. Under the second 
jurisdictional factor, the Court examines whether there is another forum 
where “there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues 
tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had.”99 
Congress vested the Court with “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies between two or more States.”100 Here, although private 
 
97.  Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992).  
98.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).  
99.  Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
100.  28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  
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parties in the litigation in the Western District of Washington raised a 
Commerce Clause challenge to Washington’s denial of the Section 401 
Certification, the litigation is not a “pending action” and Congress’ 
description of the Court’s jurisdiction as exclusive for cases between states 
denies jurisdiction of such cases to another federal court.101 Moreover, 
even if the Court determines the litigation is a “pending action,” it is likely 
the Court will hold that Plaintiffs’ interests would not be directly 
represented in another forum.102 
 The Court will likely find Plaintiffs have standing. To constitute a 
proper controversy under the Court’s original jurisdiction, “it must appear 
that the complaining [s]tate has suffered a wrong through the action of the 
other [s]tate, furnishing ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right 
against the other [s]tate which is susceptible of judicial enforcement 
according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems 
of jurisprudence.”103 Moreover, when a plaintiff is not the object of the 
government action or inaction it challenges, standing is “substantially 
more difficult” to establish.104 The Court finds a direct injury when one 
state merely reduces another state’s ability to collect severance tax 
revenues.105 In Wyoming, because Oklahoma’s law directly affected 
Wyoming’s ability to collect severance tax revenues, its claimed injury 
was substantial and the Court’s original jurisdiction proper.106 Like 
Wyoming, Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification directly 
affects Plaintiffs’ ability to collect severance tax revenues from its coal 
extraction and its injury is substantial enough to establish standing. 
 
B.  Dormant Commerce Clause  
In its analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause issue, the Court 
will likely consider two arguments. On one hand, as Plaintiffs contend, 
Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial restricts the free-flow of 
goods across state lines and allows a single state to dictate the terms of 
interstate commerce based on its own political and economic interests—
implicating the core reasons the Dormant Commerce Clause exists.107 On 
the other hand, as Washington argues, Congress expressly and 
unambiguously authorized states to deny certification under Section 401 
of the CWA where state water quality standards are not met.108 
 
101.  Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77–78.  
102.  Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 437.  
103.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (quoting 
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939)).  
104.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).  
105.  Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 451.  
106.  Id. at 452.  
107.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 22, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152. 
108.   Def. Br. In Opp’n at 21, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. Of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006)). 
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 Washington’s strongest argument is that Ecology did what 
Congress authorized it to do by denying Section 401 certification because 
the Terminal proposal did not comply with state water quality standards.109 
If the Court accepts this argument, Ecology’s implementation of federal 
law would not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.110 The Court will 
likely agree with Washington’s assertion that Ecology’s Section 401 
denial was expressly authorized by Congress in the CWA, but will likely 
give substantial weight to Plaintiffs assertion that Washington’s denial of 
the Section 401 Certification was discriminatory. The Court’s evaluation 
of whether Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification was to 
protect its economic and political interests will likely hinge on its 
interpretation of the evidence presented by the parties and the Court’s 
willingness to expand the scope of its Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. 
The Court will likely find that Washington facially discriminated 
against Plaintiffs by denying the Section 401 Certification because it did 
not treat in-state and out-of-state business equally and discriminated 
against Montana and Wyoming coal. The Court will likely reject 
Washington’s argument that none of the reasons set forth in Ecology’s 
order denying the application has anything to do with favoring in-state 
industry or disfavoring out-of-state industry because its exclusive focus is 
protecting state water quality and the health, safety, and welfare of 
Washington citizens. Instead, the Court will likely scrutinize the extensive 
record presented by Plaintiffs in which Washington officials state a 
preference for its agricultural products, industry, and less scrutiny in its 
SEPA review for in-state projects. Like Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where 
the Court invalidated a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of 
waste that originated outside the territorial limits of the State, the Court 
will likely find the record supports Washington’s intention to slow or 
freeze the flow of coal importation for protectionist reasons.111 The Court 
will likely agree with Plaintiffs and view the evidence in this case as a 
“rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to 
discriminate against interstate goods.”112 An examination of the 
circumstances here will weigh in favor of the Court finding the Section 
401 Certification for water quality reasons “could not have been the goal” 
of the purported denial.113 
 However, even if the Court agrees with Washington and does not 
accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the purpose of Washington’s denial was 
motivated by economic reasons to protect its agricultural interests, the 
 
109.  Id. at 21–22 (citing Order Denying Section 401 Water Quality 
Certification at 14–19).  
110.  Id. at 22.  
111.  437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).  
112.  Pls’ Br. in Resp., at 25, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (quoting 
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)). 
113.   Def. Br. In Opp’n at 29, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Minnesota 
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 n.15 (1981)). 
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Court will still likely find the effect of Washington’s decision to be 
discriminatory. Washington’s strongest argument on this issue is that the 
Section 401 Certification denial does not prevent Montana and Wyoming 
coal exports through existing ports.114 However, the Court will likely find 
Plaintiffs’ assertion, that no state has the power to “burden or constrict” 
the flow of commerce, persuasive.115 
The Court will likely reject Washington’s reliance on Norfolk 
Southern Corp.116 Instead, the Court will likely find two cases—Hunt and 
C&A Carbone—clearly establish that a facially neutral state action, such 
as the Section 401 Certification denial at issue here, is discriminatory if 
there is proof of a discriminatory impact.117 
In Hunt, the Court found discrimination based on the disparate 
impact of a law against out of staters.118 A North Carolina law required 
that all closed containers of apples sold or shipped into the state bare “no 
grade other than applicable U.S. grade or standard.”119 The Court found 
that the law was facially neutral in that all apples sold in the state—
whether produced in state or out of state—had to comply with this rule. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that the law had the practical effect of 
burdening and discriminating against the sale of Washington apples.120  
Here, like Hunt, the Court will likely weigh whether the effect of 
Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial discriminates against 
Montana and Wyoming coal while protecting Washington agriculture and 
in-state industries. However, unlike Hunt, the Court will be required to 
determine whether a Dormant Commerce Clause violation can be based 
on favoring one industry over another—here, denying a Section 401 
certification to build a terminal to preserve rail capacity for Washington 
agricultural products—as opposed to favoring in-state participants over 
out-of-state participants in the same industry. Despite this distinction, the 
Court will likely scrutinize the record to determine whether the 
discriminatory impact on Montana and Wyoming coal was not an 
unintended byproduct of a neutral Section 401 Certification denial.  
 The Court also found discrimination based on the disparate impact 
of a facially neutral law in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.121 
There, a city adopted an ordinance that required all nonhazardous solid 
waste in the town to be deposited at a transfer station. The law allowed 
recyclers to continue to receive solid waste, but they had to bring their 
 
114.  Id. at 23.  
115.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 27–28, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152 (citing H.P. 
Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533). 
116.  Def’s Br. In Opp’n at 26; Norfolk v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 401 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
117.  Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 
(1977); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994). 
118.  Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 351. 
119.   Hunt, 432 U.S. at 339.  
120.   Id. at 351.  
121.  511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994). 
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nonrecyclables to the transfer station.122 The Court deemed the law 
discriminatory because of its effect on out-of-staters. The Court will likely 
be persuaded by Plaintiffs’ reliance on C&A Carbone to further its 
argument that “[f]or a State to deny a permit based on factors ‘it might 
deem harmful to the environment’ is illegitimate and ‘would extend the 
[State’s] police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds.’”123 
 Because the Court will likely find Washington’s Section 401 
Certification denial discriminatory, and there is a strong presumption 
against discriminatory state action, it is unlikely Washington will be 
successful in articulating an important purpose.  
 
C.  Foreign Commerce Clause Claims 
 The Supreme Court has only considered a few cases implicating 
the Foreign Commerce Clause.124 As foreign commerce in the globalized 
economy reaches deeper inside state boundaries to touch local activity, 
and as the United States more aggressively projects a wide assortment of 
public and private laws to activity outside its borders, this is likely to 
change. However, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will hear this issue and 
will instead focus on the Dormant Commerce Clause claim. However, if 
it does, the Court will likely focus its analysis on whether the Section 401 
Certification denial interferes with the federal government’s ability to 
“speak with one voice with regard to commercial relations with foreign 
governments.”125 
Plaintiffs’ strongest argument on this issue is that the federal 
government has made its position clear that exporting coal to Asia and 
other global markets is important to the American economy and protecting 
national security.126 Like its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the 
Court will likely agree with Washington’s assertion that the Department 
of Ecology’s Section 401 denial was expressly authorized by Congress in 
the CWA, but the Court will likely give substantial weight to Plaintiffs’ 
assertion that Washington’s denial of the permit was discriminatory. 
Therefore, it is likely the Court will find the permit denial violates the 
Foreign Commerce Clause. 
 
122.  Id.  
123.  Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 20, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152; C&A Carbone, 
511 U.S. at 393 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)).  
124.  The most important of these cases is Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of 
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).  
125.  Japan Line Ltd., 441 U.S. at 449.  
126.  Pl’s Br. In Supp. at 32 (citing Remarks by President Trump at the 
Unleashing American Energy Event (June 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS43-Z9PK); 
see also Executive order 13783 (Mar. 28, 2017); David Farenthold and Michael Shear, 
As Obama Visits Coal Country, Many Are Wary of His Environmental Policies, 
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2010); Advancing U.S. Coal Exports An Assessment of 
Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Coal, NATIONAL COAL COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/ 
L9CV-L5PA). 
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 V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court will likely find Washington’s denial of the Section 401 
Certification to be discriminatory and in violation of the Dormant 
Commerce and Foreign Commerce clauses. Whether the Court determines 
the purpose of Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification was 
to protect its economic and political interests will likely hinge on its 
interpretation of the evidence presented by the parties and the Court’s 
willingness to expand the scope of its Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the Court will likely find the effect of 
Washington’s decision to be discriminatory. At a minimum, the Court’s 
holding in this case will provide guidance to states on the scope of its 
permitting authority under Section 401 of the CWA. 
